Ideas from 'The Metaphysics of Causation' by Jonathan Schaffer [2007], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
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10373
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Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
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10367
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There is only one fact - the True
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
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10359
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In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
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10372
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Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
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10374
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There are at least ten theories about causal connections
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
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10366
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Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things
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10377
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Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected'
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10378
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A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way
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10382
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Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
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10375
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At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction
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10389
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Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained
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10390
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Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
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10380
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Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it
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10385
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If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
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10388
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Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations
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10387
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The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
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10384
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If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive
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10386
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If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
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10361
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Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
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10360
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Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
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10362
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One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
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10368
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If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
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10383
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The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
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10393
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Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis
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10394
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Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
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10376
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The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause
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10381
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All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive
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